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Abstract 
Applying a standard model of endogenous quality choice to the case of multiple national markets 
(i.e., a developed and a less developed country), we consider the effect of an economic 
integration (i.e., a movement from segmented markets into a single integrated market through the 
removal of trade barriers) on price, quality, and consumer surplus. We show that the effect 
depends on the difference between the consumer distributions of the two countries and the degree 
of trade barrier costs. In particular, if the difference between the consumer distributions of them is 
large (small) and/or the degree of trade barrier costs is low (high), an economic integration 
decreases (increases) the quality level and the welfare of the two countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At present, negotiations regarding regional free trade and economic partnership agreements (e.g., 
Trans Pacific Partnership) are progressing among many countries. About 50 years ago, Balassa 
(1961a, b) pointed out that the term “economic integration” was not clear, even in the economic 
literature. Therefore, Balassa defined the concept of economic integration and considered the 
static and the dynamic effects of an economic integration, and also the problems with the 
harmonization of social, fiscal, and monetary policies. Since then, many researchers have 
analyzed different issues regarding an economic integration in various contexts. For a survey of 
regional economic integration, see, for example, Baldwin and Venables (1995). Furthermore, 
Sapir (2011) reviews developments in the economic literature and in the process of European 
integration since the publication of Balassa’s book. 
In this paper, we first note that: “Economic integration entails a movement, through the 
removal of tariff and nontariff measures, from segmented national markets towards a single 
integrated market” (Ishikawa, 2004, p. 706). This definition is given in the context of 
international economics. Accordingly, we consider how a significant change in an international 
market structure affects the behavior of firms and their decisions on price, output, and investment, 
and also the welfare in each country. 
   In this paper, using a standard model of endogenous quality choice by a monopoly, we 
analyze the effect of an economic integration on the price and quality decisions of the monopoly 
and on the consumer surplus in the countries involved. In particular, in the situation of segmented 
national markets with trade barrier costs before an economic integration, the monopoly imposes 
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price discrimination in each national market and, thus, decides the quality level under a regime of 
discriminated pricing. On the other hand, in the situation of a single integrated market without 
any trade barrier costs after an economic integration, the monopoly sets a uniform price and 
chooses the quality level under the regime of uniform pricing through pressure from price 
arbitrage. Therefore, comparing the equilibrium outcomes, i.e., price, output, quality, and welfare 
in each situation, we consider the effect of an economic integration. In other words, we show the 
conditions necessary to sustain an economic integration that is Pareto improving for the countries 
involved. 
   We review papers that are related to our monopoly framework model in which we exploit 
three-degree price discrimination and parallel trade analysis. Layson (1994) analyzed the effect of 
market opening under price discrimination, and identified the factors that favor markets opening 
under price discrimination. One is that the price elasticities in the two markets are far apart. 
Conversely, an economic integration between the two countries with this condition harms the 
consumers and, thus, leads to a Pareto welfare loss. As noted below, the price elasticity in our 
model depends on the distribution of consumers in each country and the quality level of the 
product. In this case, if the difference in consumer distributions between the two countries is very 
large, an economic integration decreases their welfare. Furthermore, the quality level is affected 
by trade barrier costs under the regime of price discrimination in the case of segmented markets. 
Thus, if the degree of trade barrier costs is very small, an economic integration also decreases the 
welfare of the two countries. 
   Related to this point, Layson (1994), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), and others show the case 
where the monopoly does not provide the product to the country with a weak demand (i.e., a low 
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willingness to pay for the product or a high price elasticity of demand) in the regime of a single 
integrated market by an economic integration, if there is a large difference in the demand 
structure between the two countries. This is because the profit of the monopoly decreases in the 
regime of uniform pricing under a single integrated market. In this paper, we present the 
condition for such a situation to occur. 
Furthermore, Ishikawa (2004) examined the effect of an economic integration in a monopoly 
framework and showed the case where according to the extent of arbitrage and the shape of the 
marginal cost curve, neither consumers nor the monopoly gain from an economic integration.  
Introducing a model of endogenous quality choice into the basic framework of these related 
papers, we examine how an economic integration affects the quality decision, that is, the 
quality-improving R&D investment, as well as the price setting, of the monopoly. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, based on a standard model 
of endogenous quality choice, we present the demand functions in the cases of segmented 
national markets and a single integrated market and the cost function of quality. In Section 3, we 
first derive the equilibrium outcomes in the cases of segmented national markets and a single 
integrated market. Then, comparing the equilibrium outcomes in these cases, we consider the 
effect of an economic integration on the monopoly and the consumers in each country. Finally, in 
Section 4, we summarize the results and indicate problems that need to be addressed. 
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2. The model 
 
We apply a standard monopoly model of an endogenous quality choice in the case of two 
segmented national markets (countries), i.e., market (country) A and market (country) B, where 
the preferences and income levels of individual consumers differ. That is, there is a continuum of 
consumers in each national market, indexed by ,,],,0[ BAiii    associated with a utility 
function:   .iii qqu    Quality, ),,0[ q  is modeled as a one-dimensional strategic variable. 
The monopoly provides the product with the same quality level to the markets. 
To simplify, we assume that consumers in each national market are uniformly distributed and 
that an individual consumer purchases either one unit or no units of the product. Hence, the net 
surplus of consumer BAii ,,   is expressed as  ,0,max iii pqv    where BAipi ,,   is the 
price in each national market. Accordingly, the index of the marginal consumer who has the same 
net surplus from purchasing one unit or no units of the product is given by .,,ˆ BAi
q
pi
i   In 
our analysis, we make the following assumption with respect to the characteristics of the national 
markets. 
 
Assumption (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005, Section 3.2) 
(i) The upper limit of the consumers in each national market is given by: ,1A ,bB  .10  b  
(ii) The density of consumers in each national market is given by: ,1)( Af   .1)( bf B   
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Parameter b  expresses the difference between the distribution of the income level and the 
preference of consumers in the two countries.1 In this case, as the value of b  approaches zero, 
the difference in consumer distributions between the two countries increases, and the demand 
structure between them becomes more discrepant. Thus, the difference between the price 
elasticity of demand in the two countries becomes greater. In this paper, we assume that country 
A (B) is a developed (a relatively less developed) country.  
Given the above assumption, the demand functions in the regime of price discrimination 
under segmented national markets are given by: 
,1
q
px AA                                                           (1) 
.11
bq
p
q
pb
b
x BBB 


                                                (2) 
In the regime of uniform pricing, i.e., ,ppp BA   under a single integrated market, the 
monopoly provides the product to countries A and B, given the same price and quality level of the 
product. Hence, the total demand function is given by:2 
.12
q
p
b
bxxX BA
                                               (3) 
                                                     
1 Alternatively, parameter b implies the strength of the willingness to pay in country B (e.g., 
Ikeda and Toshimitsu, 2010). If the value of parameter b  is small, the strength of the 
willingness to pay is weak in country B. 
2 For equation (3), we derive: (i) if ,qp   ;0X   (ii) if ,bqpq   ;1
q
pxX A   and 
(iii) if ,0 pbq  .12
q
p
b
bxxX BA
  
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Next, we assume that the monopoly decides the quality level of the product before setting the 
price. In other words, the monopoly must undertake an investment in R&D to improve the quality 
and to build a product line and facility to produce the product associated with the new quality 
level. In this case, we assume that the cost function of quality is given by: 
.0,)(
2
)( 2  gqgqGG                                                (4) 
Furthermore, to simplify the model, we assume that the marginal cost of production is 
independent of quality and is zero. 
 
 
3. The effect of economic integration on consumers and the monopoly 
 
3.1 Equilibrium under segmented markets: price discrimination and trade barrier costs 
We assume that a monopoly locates in country A, and that there are trade barrier costs between 
the two countries (e.g., a tariff, a non-tariff barrier, a transportation cost, and a transaction cost). 
Thus, the monopoly is burdened by the costs to provide the product to country B unless the two 
countries become integrated into a single market. 
Under these circumstances, we consider the price discrimination and quality decision of the 
monopoly in the case of segmented national markets where the monopoly is burdened by an ad 
valorem trade barrier cost, i.e.,  1,0 . Based on equations (1), (2), and (4), the profit function 
of the monopoly can be expressed by: 
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.)(
2
1)1(1
)()1()(
2qg
bq
pp
q
pp
qGxpxpqG
B
B
A
A
BBAABA


 

 



                             (5) 
From the first-order condition to maximize the profit given by equation (5), we derive the 
equilibrium prices, outputs, and quality level as follows: 
        ,
2
D
AD
qp   ,
2
D
BD
bqp   ,
2
1 BDAD xx  ,4
)1(1
g
bqD
                     (6) 
where subscript D denotes the regime of price discrimination under segmented national markets. 
Furthermore, the profit is given by: .
32
})1(1{ 2
g
b
D
  
 
3.2 Equilibrium under an integrated market: uniform price and zero trade barrier costs  
We assume that an economic integration between the two countries has taken place, i.e., trade 
barriers between the two countries have been removed. In other words, because trade barrier 
costs are zero, i.e., ,0  the monopoly sets a uniform price under the pressure of price 
arbitrage. 
In this case, from equations (3) and (4), the profit function is given by: 
.)(
2
12
)()(
2qg
q
p
b
bp
qGpXqGBA


 
 
                                         (7) 
Thus, from the first-order condition, we derive the equilibrium price, outputs, and quality 
level as follows: 
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        ,
1 b
bqp UU   ,1
1
b
xAU   ,1 b
bxBU   ,)1( gb
bqU                         (8) 
where subscript U denotes the regime of uniform pricing under a single integrated market. 
Furthermore, the profit is given by: .
12
1 2


 b
b
gU
 
 
3.3 The effect of economic integration 
Given equations (6) and (8), we obtain the following relationship for the quality level: 
,)()()(  bqq qUD                                              (9) 
where .
)1(
)1()(
2
bb
bbq 
  It holds that 
3
1)(1)()(  bbq  and 0)(  bq  for .10  b  
Furthermore, we define:  ,)()(   bbb qq  where 0)( qb  for .10   Therefore, we 
obtain the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1 
(i) If ),(0 qbb   then ;UD qq   and 
(ii) If ,1)(  bbq   then .DU qq   
 
Suppose that 0  in the case of segmented national markets. Hence, by a well-known 
result in the third-degree price discrimination analysis, we conclude that the monopoly always 
has an incentive to improve the quality level of the product by price discrimination. However, if 
0  in this case, the removal of the trade barrier costs affects the decision of quality choice by 
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the monopoly. That is, if the consumer distribution of the two countries is sufficiently different, 
i.e., ),(0 qbb   then even though the trade barrier costs are removed by an economic 
integration, the monopoly does not improve the quality level compared with that in the case of 
segmented national markets. Contrarily, if the consumer distribution of the two countries is not 
very different, i.e., ,1)(  bbq   then the more similar the consumer distribution of the two 
countries, the stronger the effect of the removal of the trade barrier costs, and thus the more the 
monopoly has an incentive to improve the quality level. 
   Related to this result, we obtain the effect of an economic integration on the monopoly’s 
profit as follows: ).()()( qUD bb   Thus, we understand that an economic 
integration affects the monopoly’s profit in a similar way to the effect on the quality level. In 
other words, an economic integration is preferable for the monopoly if the consumer distributions 
in the two countries are similar and/or the trade barrier costs are large. This implies that the effect 
of the removal of trade barrier costs is stronger than that of price discrimination. 
We now investigate the effect on prices. If the quality levels in the cases of price 
discrimination and uniform pricing are assumed to be identical, i.e., ,qqq UD   it holds that 
,BDUAD ppp   according to the degree of price elasticity of demand in each national market. 
However, because of the endogenous quality choice by the monopoly, and the presence of trade 
barrier costs, we consider the effect of the quality level chosen and the removal of costs on prices.  
Based on equation (6) and (8), regarding the price effect in country A, where the price 
elasticity is small, we obtain the following relationship: 
,)()()(  bpp AUAD                                            (10) 
 11
where ),0(
)1(
8)1()( 2
23


bb
bbbA ,7
122)(1)()(  bbA  and 0)(  bA  for 
.10  b  Here, we define the following:  ,)()(   bbb ApA  where 0)( pAb  for 
.10   Therefore, we derive: if ),(0 pAbb   then ;UAD pp   if ,1)(  bbpA   then 
.ADU pp   
Similarly, regarding the price effect in country B, where the price elasticity is large, we obtain 
the following relationship: 
,)()()(  bpp BUBD                                            (11) 
where .
)1(
8)1()( 2
3
bb
bbbB 
  In this case, it holds that 25)(0)()(  bbB  and 
0)(  bB  for .250  b  If ,125  b  then it holds that .0)(  bB  Thus, we have 
.BDU pp   That is, even though there are no trade barrier costs, if the difference in the consumer 
distributions of the two countries is not very large, then an economic integration raises the price 
in country B.  
Furthermore, we have .223)(1)()(  bbB  Here, we define the following: 
 ,)()(   bbb BpB  where 0)( pBb  for .10   Therefore, we derive the following 
relationships: if ),( 0 pBbb   then ;UBD pp   and if ,1)(  bbpB   then .BDU pp   
   Taking equation (10) and (11) into account, it follows that )()( bb BA   for .10  b  
Thus, we have ),()(  pApB bb   given .  We summarize the effects on prices in the following 
corollary. 
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Corollary 
(i) If ),(0 pBbb   then it holds that ;, UBDAD ppp   
(ii) If ),()(  pApB bbb   then it holds that ;BDUAD ppp   and  
(iii) If ,1)(  bbpA   then it holds that ., BDADU ppp   
 
If the difference in the consumer distributions of the two countries is large (small), that is, 
parameter b  is close to zero (unity), then an economic integration lowers (raises) the price 
compared with that in the case of segmented markets. From another viewpoint, we interpret these 
results as follows: prices depend on the price elasticity of demand in each situation in the 
international market (i.e., segmented national markets or a single integrated market) and on the 
quality level. Here, we define the price elasticity of demand in each country: ,
ik
ik
ik
ik
ik x
p
p
x

  
,, BAi   ,,UDk   where ,UBUAU ppp   and subscript Dk  )(U  denotes the regime of 
price discrimination under segmented national markets (the regime of uniform pricing under a 
single integrated market).  
Taking account of equations (1), (2), (6), and (8), we derive the price elasticity of demand at 
the equilibrium in the cases of segmented national markets and a single integrated market as 
follows: .11
b
b BUBDADAU    That is, the price elasticity of demand at the 
equilibrium in the two countries in the case of segmented national markets is equal to a unity. 
However, the price elasticity of demand at the equilibrium in country A (B) decreases (increases) 
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in the case of a single integrated market. This implies that the amount of consumption in country 
A (B) increases (decreases) through an economic integration, compared with that in the case of 
segmented national markets.  
   Finally, we consider the effect on consumer surplus in each country. Consumer surplus in 
each country is expressed as: 
  1ˆ 2)(2)(A AkkAAkAkAk xqdpqCS                                        (12) 
and 
  b BkkBBkBkBk
B
xbqdpq
b
CS  ˆ 2 ,)(2)(
1                                   (13) 
where ,Dk  .U  It is clear from equations (12) and (13) that consumer surplus is decided by the 
amount of consumption and the quality level. In view of equations (6) and (8), the amount of 
consumption in country A (B) increases (decreases) through an economic integration. This is 
because, with respect to the quality-adjusted price, it holds that .
D
BD
U
U
D
AD
q
p
q
p
q
p   On the other 
hand, as shown in Proposition 1, the quality level in each case depends on the difference in the 
consumer distributions of the two countries, i.e., ),1(b  and the degree of trade barrier costs, 
i.e., ).1(  
Comparing consumer surpluses of countries A and B in the case of segmented national 
markets with those in the case of a single integrated market, we obtain the following 
relationships: 
)(
)1(
16)1()()( 3
4


bb
bbbCSCS AAUAD                            (14) 
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and  
.)(
)1(
16)1()()( 3
34


bb
bbbCSCS BBUBD                           (15) 
   Furthermore, because total consumer surplus is given by ,BkAkk CSCSCS   ,,UDk   we 
obtain the following relationship: 
.)(
)1(
)1(16)1()()( 4
35


bb
bbbbCSCS UD                         (16) 
   Based on equations (14), (15), and (16), we define as follows:  ,)()(   bbb AA  where 
;0)( Ab   ,)()(   bbb BB  where ;0)( Bb and  ,)()(   bbb  where .0)( b  
See the Appendix for the properties of the functions given by equations (14), (15), and (16). Thus, 
we have the following results, stated in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 
(i) If 0< ),(Abb   then it holds that ,AUAD CSCS   ,BUBD CSCS   and ;UD CSCS   
(ii) If ),()(  bbbA   then it holds that ,AUAD CSCS  ,BUBD CSCS   and ;UD CSCS   
(iii) If ),()(  Bbbb   then it holds that ,AUAD CSCS  ,BUBD CSCS   and ;UD CSCS   and 
(iv) If ,1)(  bbB   then it holds that ,AUAD CSCS  ,BUBD CSCS   and .UD CSCS   
 
Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we state that if the difference between the consumer 
distributions of the two countries is large (small), i.e., parameter )1(b  is small (large), and/or 
the degree of trade barrier costs, i.e., ),1(  is low (high), then an economic integration 
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decreases (increases) the quality level and the welfare of the two countries. Thus, an economic 
integration is a Pareto improvement for the two countries, if the demand structures for the two 
countries are very similar and/or if the degree of trade barrier costs is sufficiently large. 
From the point of view of the monopoly, if the demand structures of the two countries are 
very similar, the strength of an incentive to invest in quality improvement R&D is not very 
different between the case of segmented national markets and that of a single integrated market. 
Conversely, even though the demand structures of the two countries are different, if the degree of 
trade barrier costs is sufficiently large, then the removal of trade barrier costs by an economic 
integration helps the monopoly have an incentive to invest in quality improvement R&D. 
 
3.4 Large demand dispersion  
As considered in Layson (1994), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), and others, if there is large 
demand dispersion and market asymmetry between the two countries, the monopoly located in 
country A might not export the product to country B, even though trade barrier costs are removed 
by an economic integration. 
With respect to monopoly pricing, we consider the case of large demand dispersion where 
parameter b  is sufficiently small. Given the same quality level, comparing the profit of the 
monopoly providing the product to the two countries in the regime of uniform pricing under a 
single integrated market with that of the monopoly providing the product to country A only, we 
have the following relationship: 
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.
3
1)(
)(
24
1)()(
21
22


b
qgqqgq
b
b
AU 
                               (17) 
Equation (17) implies that the monopoly does not provide the product to country B because 
its profit decreases, even though there is potentially a positive demand in country B in the regime 
of uniform pricing, whenever there is a large demand dispersion between the two countries, i.e., 
.
3
1b  Otherwise, the monopoly provides the product to the two countries under an economic 
integration. In this case only (i.e., 
3
1b ), the equilibrium outcomes shown in equation (8) are 
valid.  
Therefore, in the large demand dispersion case, the price and the quality level are given by 
2
A
A
qp   and .
4
1
g
qA   Also, the profit that the monopoly can obtain in country A only is given 
by .
32
1
gAA
   Taking account of equation (6), we obtain the following results: ,ADA pp   
,DA qq   ,DA   and .ADA CSCS   Furthermore, it holds that .0 BDB CSCS   
   Paradoxically, if there exists a large demand dispersion between the two countries (or the 
consumer distributions of the two countries are sufficiently different), welfare in the two 
countries is sustained by the presence of trade barrier costs.  
   Here, related to this point, we discuss how an international market structure is endogenously 
determined by parameter b  and trade barrier costs, ,  which is exogenously given in this 
paper. As analyzed in Wright (2003), we assume that a trade barrier cost is a tariff, which is 
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decided by policymakers in country B. In this case, if the market in country B is very small, i.e., 
,
3
1b  the policymakers in country B set a positive tariff level to maximize welfare. As a result, 
segmented national markets remain between the two countries. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Applying the analysis of third-degree price discrimination based on a standard monopoly model 
of endogenous quality choice, we have considered the effects of an economic integration between 
two countries where the price elasticity of demand is different and depends on the distribution of 
consumers in each national market and the quality level of the product provided by a monopoly.  
In our model, there are two ways in which an economic integration affects the price and 
quality decisions of the monopoly. First, there is a positive effect in that incentive to improve the 
quality level increases with the removal of trade barrier costs such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
transportation costs, and other costs. Second, there is a negative effect in that the gain from price 
discrimination under segmented markets vanishes because of the pressure of price arbitrage under 
a single integrated market. Hence, the incentive to improve the quality level decreases by 
reducing the gain, which is negatively related to the difference between the consumer 
distributions of the two countries. Therefore, whenever the positive effect exceeds the negative 
effect, an economic integration enhances the welfare of the two countries. 
   We understand the specificity of our model. For example, we have assumed an ad valorem 
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trade barrier cost and zero marginal cost of production. Furthermore, we have assumed the cost 
function of quality is independent of the output (i.e., a fixed-type cost function). These specific 
assumptions are designed not only to focus on the effect of an economic integration on the 
quality improvement R&D decision of the monopoly, but also to simplify the model. However, 
they need to be generalized in future analysis. Furthermore, we intend to extend the model to the 
case of an international duopoly based on a model of vertical product differentiation. 
 
 
Appendix: On the properties of the functions of parameter b  
First, the function given by equation (14), i.e., 3
4
)1(
16)1()(
bb
bbbA 
  for ,10  b  has the 
following properties: 
1) 1)(  bA  for ;078.00  b  1)(0  bA  for ;087.0078.0  b  and 0)(  bA  for 
;1087.0  b  
2)  )0(bA  and ;0)1(  bA  and 
3) 0)(  bA  for ;212.00  b  0)(  bA  for ;212.0b  and 0)(  bA  for .1212.0  b  
   Second, the function given by equation (15), i.e., 3
34
)1(
16)1()(
bb
bbbB 
  for ,10  b  has 
the following properties: 
1) 1)(  bB  for ;658.00  b  and 1)(0  bB  for ;1658.0  b   
2)  )0(bA  and ;0)1(  bA  and 
3) 0)(  bA  for .10  b   
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   Third, for the function given by (16), i.e., 4
35
)1(
)1(16)1()(
bb
bbbb 
  for ,10  b  has 
the following properties: 
1) 1)(  b  for ;087.00  b  1)(0  b  for ;25087.0  b  and 0)(  b  for 
;125  b  
2)  )0(b  and ;0)1(  b  and 
3) 0)(  b  for ;2.00  b  0)(  b  for ;2.0b  and 0)(  bA  for .12.0  b  
   Finally, based on the properties of the functions shown above, we can derive 
)()()( bbb BA   for .10  b  Therefore, we have ),()()(  BA bbb   given 
).10(   
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